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I. Introduction
1. At a time when protectionist tendencies are on the upswing world
wide once again, it is important to gain evidence on the cause of such
movements. Proper diagnosis of the determinants of protection may
provide a more promising avenue to avoiding discriminatory economic
policies than reiteration of the welfare losses of protection has been
able to dp. For this purpose Germany constitutes a potentially fruitful
case study. First, historically, economic and political regimes have
varied widely. Second, institutional conditions at the present are unique
enough to warrant and require a closer look at the mechanisms which
provide protection. Third, Germany constitutes a large and still relative-
ly liberal market for the products of the less developed and newly
industrialized countries. Hence, trade policy developments in Germany
are likely to lead to serious repercussions in those countries.
2. The general framework chosen for analysis of German protective
mechanisms posits the existence of a political market for protection,
and follows from the work of Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962),
and Ohlson (1965), as well as the application of this principle to inter-
national trade and protection issues by a number of authors . Very brief-
ly, the demand for protection on the part of producing units is derived
from firms' opportunity costs in eliciting protection; and the supply of
protection is derived from governments' opportunity cost in granting
protection. In applying this guiding hypothesis to Germany, explanatory
1 Especially Cheh (1974), Krueger (1974), Pincus (1975), Baldwin (1976),
Riedel (1977), Anderson (1978, 1979)> and Brock and Magee (1978).
A first draft of this paper was presented at the World Bank Workshop
on Market Penetration in Kiel, November 1979. Helpful comments were
received from Robert Baldwin, Juergen B. Donges, Helen Hughes,, Ian
Little, Jean Waelbroeck and other participants in the workshop. In addi-
tion, Grant Kirkpatrick and Konrad Lammers provided helpful dis-
cussion and advice for the current draft. '-'. > ; ;u i ..- • • • • :h .' ..- 2 -
variables are sought which messure or proxy those opportunity costs,
both on average over time, and. across industries at a point in time. The
specific hypotheses tested must in part be derived from institutional
features peculiar to Germany. In the next section of this paper, this
framework is applied historically to the period 1880 - 1978, and in the sec-
tion thereafter, it is applied to explain the structure of protection in
manufacturing industries in 1974. Developments since then are briefly
discussed.
II. Overall Protection and Economic Growth in Germany: 1880 - 1978
A. Hypothesis
3. The central hypothesis is that overall economic conditions determine
changes in protection over time. Assuming economic rents lead factors
of production to demand protection and makes politicians grant protec-
tion, it seems reasonable to argue that protectionist demand depends on
the returns of protection for producing units and on the costs of lobbying;
the supply of protection would depend on the returns to protection for
politicians and on the costs politicians may face when granting protection.
The development of national product can be assumed to incorporate both
demand and supply factors of protection: the higher overall economic
growth the more possibilities for the factors of production to increase
their welfare through the market, that is without lobbying. With slow
economic growth, and unemployment prevailing, opportunity costs of
lobbying are relatively low. Another point which may have been relevant
in the German case during the last decade is that in times of slow growth
job tenure legislation becomes more and more effective; at the same
time entrepreneurs are increasingly aware of the help governments are
willing to give in times of recession. Once such a vicious circle is started,
inefficiency leads to protection, which again increases inefficiency.- 3 -
B. Empirical Background
4. In the time series analysis income has been taken as an indicator of
growth prospects. An effort was made to extend the time series back as
far as possible in order to make use of the widely varying political and
economic conditions extant in Germany in the past. Data could be gathered
back to 1880 (excluding both war and post war periods). The endogenous
variable protection is prcxiedby the average tariff rate . Tariff rates were
calculated by expressing tariff revenues as per cent of dutiable imports
as well as of total imports. This procedure has its shortcomings, the first
of which is well known: the higher import duties, the lower imports; this
problem is relevant when dealing with highly aggregated figures. The
second shortcoming is that there are other protectionist devices, such
as undervaluation, which may work similarly and constitute substitutes
for tariff protection. Furthermore, not all tariff revenues are collected
through ad valorem duties. Specific duties played an important role be-
tween 1880 and 1913 for instance; inflation would then shift "tariffs" down-
wards as time passes. Import prices, however, did not increase between
1880 and 1913; in fact they delined over the whole period by some 2 %
(Hoffmann, 1965)
?.
It is extremely difficult to accurately assess non-tariff-protection of
Germany, say in 1970, even if one formally enjoys all the help of govern-
ment officials. For example, we once tried over a two year period, to
assess non-tariff-protection on behalf of the German government. Our
main problem turned out to be asking the right questions of the right persons.
There were only few government officials who knew - within their field
of work - how much protection for which goods against which countries
existed. They seemed to get much satisfaction from their monopolistic
knowledge and sometimes were reluctant to give up that position. As
far as asking the right questions is concerned,.. who would consider
asking - after being informed that a quantitative restriction on "handker-
chiefs, embroidered" is applied against imports from "country list B" -
whether this holds true for only some countries within "country list B",
in fact only for, say, South Korea. Such information is not in the public
domain, and hence not systematically published.
2
The net national product deflator increased in the same time from
27.2 to 31.9 (1962=100).- 4 -
5. The development of German average tariff rates on dutiable imports
between 1880 and IS78 is shown in Figure 1, together with net national
product and the investment share. Starting in 1880, at a rate of 11. 6 per
cent, tariff rates went up until 1896 (19. 8 p. c.). In these years of the
Empire , tariffs were a main source of income for the central govern-
ment. After that, tariffs by and large maintained the 1896 level unit 1913.
Beginning at a relatively low rate (9 p. c. ) in 1925 (the first year for which
data is available after World War I) tariff rates shot up to 64 p. c. in 1938.
The most significant increase during this period occurred in the course
of the world economic crisis after 1929, but before 1933] i.e. still under
the Weimar Republic. After World War II tariffs declined from 1953
(16 p. c.) until 1967 (7. 9 p. c. ), went up again until 1970 and after another
fall to 7. 2 p. c. in 1976 continued to rise . The last two upswings of tariffs
- between 1967 and 1969 and after 1976 - can be explained as follows: in
mid 1968 intra EC-tariffs were abolished; since these tariffs were con-
siderably lower than tariffs on imports from non-EC countries, the rise
in the tariff rate reflects a change in the geographical pattern of dutiable
imports. The rise of tariffs after 1976 is of a much different kind; it shows
the upsurge of "new protectionism" which characterised the EC s trade
policy of the last few years. The EC's new protectionism mainly consisted
of the introduction of anti-dumping duties; these anti-dumping duties were
applied on a large scale to imports of iron and steel products, chemicals,
2 data processing equipment, shoes and wooden products .
Mineral oils have been excluded from the calculations after 1950. They
have been undergoing considerable changes in taxation clearly not for
reasons of protecting domestic production. The duties were mostly
specific. Including mineral oils would lead to a drop in the tariff rate
from 12.8 per cent to 9. 0 per cent in 1963/64 for example, whereas
the figures excluding oil exhibit a slight drop only (from 10. 0 p. c. to
9.0p.c).
2
These, and other swings in the data reflecting known changes in pro-
tection policy are not visible if total imports are used instead of dutiable
imports. See also "Internationaler Vergleich ..." (1979).Tariff Rates, Net National Product and Investment Ratio




aln 1970 prices. - ^In current prices.
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i
I- 6 -
Taken together, the development of the average tariff rate from 1880
to 1978 is not at all implausible: the international delinking of Germany
after World War I for example, and especially the worldwide disintegra-
tion of markets in the course of the economic crisis of 1929, both come
out remarkably well in the "tariff rate". The same applies grosso modo
to developments after World War n, being a time of international integra-
tion of the German economy.
6. Table 1 gives an impression of the structure of tariff protection over
the last hundred years . It is apparent that duties on final goods have
been relatively invariant compared to those on raw materials, the latter
increasing significantly before both world wars. One may argue that
shortly before World War I and between both wars the effective rates of
tariff protection discriminated against final goods, simultaneously en-
couraging domestic production of raw material (substitutes) and dis-
couraging production of final goods as well as - in the interwar period -
production of food and beverages. The steadily declining "tariff rate"
of total imports as opposed to that of dutiable imports after 1953 in-
dicates that more and more products imported from abroad could be
imported duty free, suggesting that overall tariff protection was de-
clining significantly.The bulk of duty free imports, however, was due
to the regional liberalization within the EC. Marginal protection against
suppliers from third countries, as tariffs on dutiable imports indicate,
did not change that much. Indeed, the diverging trends of dutiable and
Tariff rates on food and beverages, as shown in Table 1, are con-
siderably underestimated regarding the past twenty years. Variable
levies on food imports generally raised import prices until no sub-
stitutes for domestic food production from foreign suppliers were
available within the EC ("Common Agricultural Policy"). Similar
things cannot be observed for the other periods considered; between
1880 and 1913 duties on imported food substitutes were the major


















































































Source: Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich,
current issues. - Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das
Deutsche Reich, current issues. - Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahr-
buch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, current issues, and Fachserie G,
AuBenhandel, Reihe 2, Spezialhandel nach Waren und Landern, Erganzungsheft, current
issues. .- 8 -
total imports' tariff rates may indicate that suppliers from third coun-
tries have been increasingly discriminated against since the 1960s.
C. Tariff Protection and National Income - Regression Results
7. Regressing average tariff protection on total imports between 1880
and 1978 with a simple time trend demonstrates a slightly negative trend
over the whole period:
In Prot = 2. 58 - 0.02 t R




This impression is modified when taking into account net national
product:
In Prot = - 64.98+ 0.05 t - 2. 13 In NNP
(6.21) (7.71)
R
2 = 0.55 F = 48.9
adj
The regression shows that protection declined due to the improvement
in real income. Had it not been for this improvement, protection would
possibly have increased rather than decreased over the period 1880 to
1978.
8. This is a rather crude way of testing the relationship between income
and protection. First, there are 22 years of war and post war years
which are left out of the calculation. The political regimes before World
Throughout the time series analysis there was considerable evidence
for serial correlation. Residuals analysis showed, however, that it
was mainly smooth, short run cyclical fluctuations which were left
unexplained; perhaps an additional variable - like the rate of unemploy-
ment - could have delt with this problem of autocorrelation. Reliable
employment statistics for the periods under consideration were not
available. Thus it should be noted that the t-statistics may not be as
good in many cases as has been calculated.- 9 -
War I, after World War II and in between them cannot easily be thrown
together. Indeed, the period between 1880 and 1978 in Germany comprises
rather different sets of political circumstances. One may distinguish,
in a very general way of course, three periods. The first, between 1880
and 1913, may be called the golden age of growth: internal stability,
increasing success on international markets and relatively steady and
stable growth seem to have gone hand in hand. The second period, be-
tween 1925 and 1938, was a phase of turmoil: high unemployment and
high inflation, the breakdown of international economic relations in 1929
and a strongarm economic policy after 1933 favoring cartelization and
at the same time ptirsuing autarchy. Finally, the third phase after 1950
of rapid growth, international reintegration and high social stability until
the end of the 1960s. The 1970s again brought relatively low growth, high
inflation, unemployment, stronger disintegration tendencies and an in-
creasing importance of governmental rules, regulations and income re-
distribution. Second, there may be considerable lags between recognition
of the need for trade barriers and their application. Some evidence for
a lagged relationship between protection and domestic activities is dis-
cernible from Figure 1, where after a rapid decline in investment, tariff
rates go up (for instance in the years round 1892, 1902, 1930 and 1967);
therefore lagged regressions should be applied. Third, it may be argued
that it is rather tariff revenues on dutiable imports which represent
changing degrees of protection over time.
9. Table 2 gives the relationship between national income and tariff pro-
tection for the three periods under consideration, using tariff revenues
on dutiable imports as a proxy for protection and applying an Almon
distributed lag .
Lags of three to five years and polynominals of degree two and three
were tested. The regressions presented in Table 2 are those with the
best fit. The time trends matter. Not only is R^ consistently lower
without the trend but the residuals in all periods exhibit jagged de-
partures from the regression line toward the end of each period.Table 2 - Tariff Protection and National Income
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Source; Calculated from Statistisches Reichsamt (Bundesamt), Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das
Deutsche Reich (fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), current issues, and from
Glismann, Rodemer, Wolter (1978).
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10. Trade policy obviously played very different roles in the three periods
under observation. Between 1880 and 1913 protection is positively correlated
with net national product (Equation 1). This holds true for the current as
well as for a one year lag relationship. Tariffs in this period played an
important role in financing government expenditures; tariff reforms were
only to a relatively small extent thought of as providing protection to
domestic producers . The period 1880 - 1913 began with the central govern-
ment, the 'Empire ', trying to gain financial independence from the states
through a tariff reform, when Bismarck tried in vain to increase tariff
revenues for the 'Empire.« Only in 1906 did the Imperial Government
succeed in getting additional autonomous financing. Thus, increasing na-
tional income went hand in hand with increasing endeavours of the Empire.
to raise its revenues (Kolms, 1963). This may explain the positive re-
lationship between the income variable and the protection variable.
11. In the first years between 1925 and 1938 slow, if not negative growth,
was a major cause for applying trade barriers and propping up employment.
The years following 1933 witnessed a consistent policy of autarchy. It may
be said that in the period 1925 - 1938 we have an unbiased "pure" relationship
between income and protection due to the fact that non-tariff protection
played a relatively unimportant role as compared to, say, the 1970s; be-
sides tariffs being the major protectionistic device, no constraints seem
to have existed for an undisguised policy of protection (Stolper, 1966). No
politician had to argue much in those times when increasing protection
directly and openly through tariffs. Constraints due to international commit-
ments or public opinion may be regarded as having been non-existant. This
is reflected in the relatively short mean lag of one year as well as the quite
good Burbin-Watson statistic (Equation 2). It should also be noted that the
observations for 1933 - 1938 are not outliers. Apparently, the policy of
autarchy pursued then was a continuation of the trend since 1925 at the
latest. Indeed, the period 1925 - 1938 exhibits the highest trend coefficient
of all three periods.
The discussion in 1879 about whether to raise tariffs or not is presented
by Ji Conrad (1880).- 12 -
12. The years 1950 to 1978 comprise the GATT-rounds of trade
liberalization as well as the creation of the EC as shaping tariff rates.
Equation 3 shows a positive relationship between current income and
tariff protection and a significant negative relationship for the two, three
and four year lag. The current relationship possibly exhibits the con-
tinuous trend of domestic demand towards relatively highly taxed imports;
this can be observed regarding the product mix of imports - that is the
increased importance of final goods imports as well as changes in the
regional provenance - e. g. the increased importance of less developed
countries as suppliers of consumption goods. The negative lagged relationship
may demonstrate the lagged working of politics when reducing or in-
creasing protection. The lag structure seems to correspond well to the
existing four year election cycle.
13. All in all, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a
political economy of protection has been operative during the more
democratic phases of Germany' s past. During the authoritarian Empire
(1880 - 1913) economic growth does not appear to have led to tariff re-
duction. The majority of the observations in the second period fall into
the democratic but unstable Weimar phase, and a short mean lag emerges
for the influence of growth and protection, corresponding well to the hectic
pattern of general elections. Nevertheless* this period is striking for the
importance of the trend, which may be capturing the influence of the des-
integration of the world economy, a process which outlasted Weimar' s
demise^ Finally, during the third period (1950 - 1978) the political economy
approach comes into its own in a period of stable democracy characterized
by the free operation of interest groups and predictable election cycles;
The empirical results correspontiigshow a longer lag between changes
in income and changes in protection and a less important though positive
trend component, suggesting unmistakable deiiberalization tendencies in
the absence of further economic growth.- 13 -
III. The Structure of Protection in West German Manufacturing
A. Hypotheses
14. With the founding of the European Economic Community key trade
policy instruments have been relinquished by Bonn in favour of Brussels.
In fact, however, commercial policy is still determined in both cities,
and indeed, in the German provincial capitals as well. Domestically,
subsidies of various types, with various aims, have complemented the
tariff and quota as major instruments to protect domestic producers from
foreign competition. As is the case with tariffs and quotas, the subsidies
discriminate among industries; hence, the interindustry structure of pro-
duction, and with it, the inter regional distribution of trade flows be-
tween West Germany and the rest of the world, are affected. For a
plethora of ostensible motives - promoting technological change, promoting
regional development, creating jobs - and with a wide variety of instru-
ments - access to state guaranteed loans, investment rebates, current
subsidies, and tax breaks, federal, state, and local governments, to-
gether and individually, protect industries from their competitors in
domestic factor markets and hence, against their foreign competitors on
the output market.
15. Whatever the motives and means of the agencies granting subsidies,
the aggregate effective rate of domestic subsidization along with tariff
protection granted at the EEC level, is shown for manufacturing industries
in Table 3, which summarizes a unique data set on subsidies compiled
by Juttemeier et al. (1977) for the year 1974 . Included are all forms of
subsidization, such as the grant element in low interest loans, tax breaks
for various purposes, as well as direct financial transfers on the part of
federal, state, and local governments.
Revised data published in Juttemeier, Lammers (1979). The definition
of subsidies herein is far more encompassing than the data available
for Riedel' s study (1977).- 14 -
Table 3 - Effective Rates of Assistance to West German Manufacturing
8
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Leather, leather goods, shoes
Textiles
Clothing,
aExcludes petroleum refining (reportedly unreliable effective tariff pro-
tection estimate) and shipbuilding (reportedly unreliable domestic sub-
sidization estimate). In addition, computing equipment, for which absolute
subsidies are available, Is allocated to machinery and electrical equipment
because of constraint in value added data. - ERA «= effective rate of assist-
ance. -
 CTARPRO = effective rate of tariff protection^ - DOMSUB = effective
rate of subsidization due to all domestic sources. - NONREG = DOMSUB minus
effective subsidization attributable to regional aid programs. - Heavy
rounding. In subsequent calculations upt to 5 significant digits were used.
Source; Calculated from Donges, Fels, Neu (1973) and JUttemeier, Lammers
(1979).- 15 -
16. The guiding hypothesis used to explain the structure of protection
in fact granted asserts that an underlying economic logic based on the
opportunity costs of the business sector in demanding protection and of
the political sector in supplying protection is at work in determining
differential rates of effective subsidization in Germany.
In the business or interest group sector on the demand side, one would
expect that lobbying activities aimed at eliciting protection would be the
greater
- the smaller the number of firms in an industry;
- the smaller the number of employees in an industry;
- the greater the regional concentration of an industry.
In all three cases the same rationale applies:mirraunication costs are
relatively small for a small number of agents, especially when they are
physically close together and problems of excludibility are substantially
avoided. In addition, if an industry is in decline, the opportunity costs
of protection seeking are reduced for both capital and labor (though
conglomerates may find it relatively cheap to respecialize).
17. As for the government, or supply side of protection, declines in an
industry' s employment are likely to raise protection. Employees in
shrinking industries where jobs are endangered are likely to elict public
sympathy, and hence, public support and votes for protection, either on
altruistic grounds, or as a form of insurance. The altruistic argument
would also tend to apply to workers in industries where value added per
employee, or human capital, and hence, wages per employee are low.
18. In the case of industry employment, the effect on government is
opposite to the effect on interest groups. Because of the greater number
of votes at stake, large industries are more likely to be helped, leaving
the net effect ambiguous. In the case of regional concentration, a sub-- 16 -
national region would indeed aid an industry concentrated in its policy,
though the response of the national government is by no means clear
a priori. Specific institutional conditions have to be taken into account
before a hypothesis can be formulated.
19. As for the influence of industry employment, it is important to note
that German labor unions are highly encompassing organizations organized
along branch lines . Though union membership varies across industries,
in effect unions bargain and lobby for all employees of the industry they
have organized. This means that communication costs even in large
industries are not high. Hence, the propensity to demand protection would
not be reduced by increasing size. As a result, employment size is not
ambiguous in its influence on protection - it is clearly positive. If, in
addition one takes note that German industrial unions are associated in
the "Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund" (DGB) which in turn lives in symbiosis
with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and that individual industrial
unions' policies are formulated in consensus with these two organizations,
it is clear that the gains any one industrial union may achieve from govern-
ment intervention will impose costs on other members of the encompassing
organizations. Hence, any single industrial union would be loathe to press
2
special interests very hard . This in turn would mean that to the extent
that protection is positively associated with industry employment a pure
supply response on the part of government is being reflected.
The encompassingness of interest groups is a point emphasized by
Mancur Ohlson (1978) for determining the kinds of policies they will
, pursue.
2
It must be admitted, however, that there are signs of a breakdown of
such consensus. For example, the labor unions have walked out of joint
labor-management-government "Concerted Action", where incomes-
policies were negotiated. These .agreements, however, v/ere not binding.- 17 -
20. As for the influence of regional concentration on the inter-industrial
structure of domestic assistance, a number of salient features of the
German subsidization system need to be taken into account. For the in-
dustries examined here, almost half (48. 6 p. c. ) the aid received is
channeled through various regional development programs. The single
most important of these, in turn is the joint federal/state regional develop-
ment program, half financed by the federal government, and half financed
by the states as a group . Aid is distributed to individual regions (rather
than to specific industries) based on criteria determined by the federal
and state governments jointly through a Planning Commission, which has
an idiosyncratic voting procedure: each state has one vote, but the federal
government has votes equal to the sum of the number of states. Further-
more, a three-fourths majority is required to carry a proposal (Deutscher
Bundestag, 1976). But this institutional set-up implies that individual
state interests can easily be stymied: while an industry concentrated in
one state may lobby at the state level, and that state may very well desire
granting that industry regional aid, that state would have to overcome the
opposition of all the other states, as well as the federal government. While
state votes could surely be traded, a majority could never be achieved that
way. Given perfect trading among states on each issue, the federal votes
still constitute a blocking coalition.
21. The issues decided in the Planning Commission within the framework
of this program are the specification of towns and cities, along with some
of their environs as potential "poles de croissance", eligible for re-
ceiving subsidies, rediced interest loans, and loan guarantees on in-
dustrial investment undertaken there. While one may say that to be
Development aid for the area bordering East Germany is channeled
through this program as well. The zonal border area and the other
regions eligible for joint program aid constitute two thirds of West
Germany* s surface and about one third of its population. See Map 1
in "Deutscher Bundestag" (1976).- 18 -
eligible for agreement on including a specific pole , it must have a low
per capita income but an industrial base of some kind •, the states' strategy
has been to disaggregate as much as possible and thereby have as many
municipalities included in the program as possible. But this provides an
additional rationale for regionally concentrated industries to be dis-
2
criminated against in the context of this program . Hence, for the par-
ticular institutional conditions extant in Germany, the regional concentra-
tion hypothesis must be differentiated in order to sharpen it: regional aid
would tend to discriminate against regionally concentrated industries; all
other aid need not.
22. Aid granted industries outside the scope of the joint federal/state
program is project or industry specific. Thus, a multitude of individual
measures makes up the remaining 51. 4 per cent of subsidies to the manu-
facturing industries considered here. They consist of project specific R&D
programs, and industry specific job preservation or restructuring programs
and have in common the nature of their distribution: a general legal frame-
work first has to be passed by the Bundestag. Thus, the constraints on
log-rolling observable in the Planning Commission on regional development
aid are removed. Then, administration of these programs is handed over
to the ministerial bureaucracy, with funding passed more or less auto-
matically in the annual budget, once the initial law has been made. Hence,
A brief description of the formal criteria used is given in Adlung,
Gotzinger, Lammers, et al. (1979), pp. 171-179.
2
The second major regional aid program aims at maintaining the economic
viability of West Berlin. The subsidy base is similar to that of the joint
federal/state development program, namely investment. But this pro-
gram does not really promote regionally concentrated industry, as West
Berlin' s economic structure still corresponds quite well to that of the
dozen or so major German cities. Indeed, Berlin never had the relative
attractiveness for German industry that, say, Paris has to French
industry, or London to British industry.- 19 -
the distribution of funding is subject to the interaction among bureaucratic
interests, government and representatives' interests, and the lobbying
efforts of the potential recipients. As a consequence one would expect
the specific hypotheses advanced by the political economy of protection
approach would apply more unambiguously for these non-regional aids.
23. Perhaps the most important single hypothesis for the explanation of
the structure of protection specifies the degree of import penetration as
a key determinant of commercial policy (Anderson, 1979). Now, while
import penetration is only one of the sources for demand for protection,
it is important to identify this source separately because the response of
government in granting protection may differ from other sources of dis-
turbances. Some of the costs of government intervention aimed specifically
against imports will fall upon foreigners who have no votes, or little in-
fluence, in shaping domestic policy.
24. In a highly open economy like West Germany, however, exports would
have to be treated symmetrically with imports. Any given manufacturing
industry, subindustry, or product group, or even firm, will be likely to
export and import at the same time (Kravis, Lipsey 1971; Grubel, Lloyd
1975). To the extent that exports and imports are substitutes in production,
an entrepreneur may, in the face of stiffening competition from abroad,
find it cheaper to switch production from product variants under more
pressure to those under less pressure than to invest in lobbying activities.
Hence, the structure of competitiveness, or the nature of comparative
advantage, rather than import penetration would appear to constitute an
important determinant of the structure of protection.
25. While the case can be made that the structure of competitiveness
determines the structure of protection, surely the structure of protection
also codetermines the structure of competitiveness. Problems of
Firms may export their products at the same time that they act as
importers (wholesalers) of products with which to complement their
assortment.- 20 -
simultaneity creep into the testing of the hypothesis that the structure
of protection is determined by the structure of competitiveness. How-
ever, an expedient consistent with institutional conditions in Germany
suggests itself. While the structure of protection at a given point in time
influences the structure of competitiveness at the same point in time,
the reverse causal process takes time to work itself through the political
process. Hence, one would expect protection to be influenced by an
earlier state of comparative advantage. Indeed, all of the exogenous
forces bearing on the structure of protection require time to work their
way through the political process.
26. The final major hypothesis to, explain protection in Germany also
depends on an institutional idiosyncracy, namely the country' s member-
ship in the EEC. V. \ Subsidies granted by German governments add
their allocational impact to that of protection granted in Brussels.
Protection at the EEC level would tend to reduce the quantity of protection
demanded at various domestic levels, i.e. it is hypothesized that protection
from the two sources are substitutes, though how well they substitute for
one another is an empirical question.
B. Empirical Tests
27. The empirical counterparts to these constructs are relatively
str aightf o rw ar d:
- Value added per employee (1972); number of firms (1970), number
of employees (1970); and change in the number of employees (1964-1970)
are directly available.
- Human capital intensity (1970) was measured according to a concept
introduced by Kenen (1965) and amended by Fels (1972) as the dif-
ference between average hourly earnings (by industry) and the hourly
earnings of an unskilled worker in each industry. This sum constitutes
the renumeration to labor over and above the disutility incurred by the
unskilled in each industry.- 21 -
Competitiveness is measured as a variant of "revealed comparative
advantage" (Balassa, 1967) for the year 1970 as
RCA.. = (x../m..) / (£.. x../5". m..)
where x and m are exports and imports respectively and i and j are
industry and country indices. This measure possesses the desirable
property that equiproportionate decreases in exports and increases in
imports have identical effects of opposite sign on the demand and supply
of protection.
- Regional concentration is measured as the coefficient of variation of
each industry' s share in total industrial employment across 11 states.
- Effective tariff protection by industry was available for 1972.
28. Regressions run to explain the structure of domestic subsidization
to manufacturing are shown in Table 4, Equation 1 assumes that the source
of the disturbance, i. e, competitiveness, is not important. It, and Equation
2,^which omits the insignificant variables from Equation 1 and disaggregates
value added into human and physical capital do poorly in explaining the
structure of domestic subsidization as measured by the F-test. Replacing
value added, or its determinants with the structure of competitiveness
(Equation 3), which is largely determined by the structure of human capital
intensity, considerably improves the results. These results are main-
tained when competitiveness vis-a-vis non EEC countries (Equation 5) or
competitiveness vis-a-vis LDC s (Equation 6) replaces overall competitive-
ness.
29. The individual coefficients show that domestic subsidization is the
greater
- the lower competitiveness,
- the lower the number of firms,
- the lower the regional concentration, and
- the lower is EEC tariff protection.Table 4 - Determinants of Effective Domestic Subsidization to Manufacturing Industries in West Germany, 1974
Regression Equations ft"
(1) In DOMSUB a 8.19 - 1.67 In VAPE + 0.15 In NOE - 0.02 In DNOE - 0.25 In NOP - 0.72 In REG - 1.19 In TARPRO
(1.28)(-1.42) (0.78) (-0.10) (2.54)* (-2.22)* (-2.82)*,•
(2) In DOMSUB » 5.42 + 0.01 In HUM - 0.24 In KAP - 0.24 In NOF - 0.61 In REG - 0.93 In TARPRO
(1.63) (0.01) (-0.59) (-2.23)* (-U92)* (-^)
(3) In DOMSUB m 5.97 - 0.4i In RCATOT - 0.17 In NOP - 0.62 In REG - 1.50 In TARPRO
(4.43)(-2.38)» (-2.23)* (-2.25)* (-3.8i)*,a
(4) In DOMSUB • 5.39 - 0.67 In RCAEEC - 0.22 In NOP - 0.67 In REG - 1.22 In TARPRO
(3.45)(-O.7O) (-2.59)* (-2.10)* (-2.75)*,*
(5) In DOMSUB - 5.18 - 0.31 In RCANEC - 0.14 In NOF - 0.45 In REG - 1.37 In TARPRO
(4.15)(-2.64)* (-1.69)** (-1.63)** (-3.80)*,*
(6) In DOMSUB a 7.01 - 0.15 RCALDC - 0.26 In NOF - 0.68 In REG - 1.59 In TARPRO







t-statistics in parentheses] 'significant at 5 p.c.i ** a significant at 10 p.c.f a not significantly different
from minus unity at 5 p.c.
DOMSUB B total effective subsidization from domestic sources; TARPRO a effective rate of tariff protectiont
NOE a number of employees 1970; DNOE = change in the number of employees, 1964-1970} NOP *> number of firms
1970; REG « regional concentration 1970 (variation coefficient of industry i's employment share across 11
"BundeslSnder")? HUM a human capital intensity 1970 (average wage per employee minus unskilled worker's wage))
KAP • physical capital intensity 1970 (gross fixed capital in 1970 prices)^ RCA... = "revealed comparative








Source» Calculated from Donges, Fels, Neu (1973)| Juttemeier, Lammers (1979); Statistisches Bundesamt,
Wiesbaden ^Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, var. iss.; Fachserie 7,
Reihe 7, 197Q7.- 23 -
The direction of influence of regional concentration accords with the
particular institutional framework used to distribute funds in Germany.
However, a key variable, the number of employees in an industry does
not emerge significant from the test, implying a limited political economy
of protection in Germany.
30. These results agree in one aspect with work done by Juttemeier et al.
(1977, p. 200), who calculated Spearman coefficients between domestic
assistance, tariff protection and total protection and a number of industry
characteristics on a slightly different sample. The highest coefficient
they obtained was for a correlation between the structure of total protection
and the structure of competitiveness (- 0. 67). However, they found a
significant positive association between human capital intensity and domestic
assistance. The lack of this relationship here may perhaps be explained
by inclusion of tariff protection as an explanatory variable in the present
study.
31. In any case, this picture changes, when the non-regional component
of domestic subsidization, i. e. R&D aid and special industry programs,
is subject to test (Table 5) alone . Following the same testing strategy
outlined above for domestic subsidization, the number of employees in
each industry does emerge significantly with the expected, sign (Equation 2
and 4), lending additional support to the existence of a political economy
of protection in Germany. Regional concentration was never significant
in regressions (not shown) explaining non-regional aids, as could be ex-
pected by the ambiguity introduced by the existence of more than one level
of government.
Here regional assistance is added to tariff protection to form the ex-
planatory variable "RESTAID".Table 5 - Determinants of Effective Domestic Non-regional Assistance to Manufacturing Industries in West
Germany, 1974 (n a 26)
Regression Equations
(1) In NONREG a 0.00 + 0.17 In HUM - 0.22 In KAP - 0.32 In NOF + 0.45 In NOE - 1.24 In RESTAID
(0.00) (0.12) (-0.28) (-1.19) (1.07) (-0.95)
(2) In NONREG s-0.34 - 0.83 In RCATOT + 0.75 In NOE - 0.32 In NOF - 2.33 In RESTAID
(-O.O8)(-2.26)* (2.19)* (-1.96)* (-2.92)*
(3) In NONREG = 0.50 - 0.06 In RCAEC + 0.47 In NOE - 0.33 In NOF - 1.52 In RESTAID
((O.11)(-O.17) (1.25) (-1.81)* (-1.74)*
(4) In NONREG =-1.10 - 0.57 In RCANEC + O.69 In NOE - 0.27 In NOF - 2.08 In RESTAID
(-0.28)(-2.40)* (2.13)* (-1.71)* (-2.83)*
(5) In NONREG a 1.47 - 0.16 In RCALDC + 0.58 In NOE - 0.40 In NOF - 2.02 In RESTAID











t-statietics in parentheses) * a significant at 5 P.c.j •• significant at 10 p.c. -
In NONREG s effective rate of domestic assistance not attributable to regional aid programs} In RESTAID =
effective rate of assistance attributable to regional aid programs plus effective tariff protection;
NOE a number of employees, 1970; DNOE = change in the number of employees, 1964-1970; NOF a number of
firms, 1970} REG a regional concentration 1970 (variation coefficient of industry i's employment share
across 11 "BundeslSnder"); HUM a human capital intensity, 1970 (average wage per employee minus unskilled
worker's wage); KAP » physical capital intensity, 1970 (gross fixed capital in 1970 prices); RCA... a "re-
vealed comparative advantage" (exports/imports), with TOT a vis-a-vis total world, NEC • vis-a-vis EEC
non-members, LDC = vis-a-vis less developed countries.
Source 1 Calculated from Donges, Fels, Neu (1973)» Jiittemeier, Lammers (1979); Statistisches Bundesamt,
Wiesbaden /Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, var.iss.; Fachserie 7,
Reihe 7, 197Q7.- 25 -
C. Recent Developments in Policy Making and Competition from LDC s
.32. Hence, it is not surprising that regional economic and political forces
have been trying to circumvent those institutions and attempting to get aid
for industries concentrated in their regions through the annual budgetary
(parliamentary) process. This is reflected in programs to help ship-
building, concentrated in the coastal states, which more than doubled be-
tween 1974 and 1979 (Jiittemeier, Lammers, p. 46). In addition, the
maritime states are demanding federal matching funds for a coastal
2
program , and a "Ruhr-Program" initiated on the insistence of North-
Rhine Westphalia has passed the Bundestag. But one may fear that "coastal
program" and "Ruhr-program" really mean "shipbuilding program" and
"steel industry program".
33. It was argued that the source of pressure matters in determining the
supply of protection (para 23), i.e. that the political process would more
readily grant subsidies to industries suffering from low international
competitiveness given all else. Does the geographical source of that foreign
competition matter? A comparison of Equation 5 and 6, Table 4 with
Equations 4 and 5, Table 5 testing total domestic subsidization and non-
regional domestic subsidization, sheds some light on this issue. Whereas
the structure of competitiveness against all non-EEC member countries
co-determines the structure of total as well as of non-regional subsidiza-
tion, the same is not true of competitiveness vis-a-vis the LDC s alone.
That variable has explanatory power only when regional subsidies are
included. Apparently, regional aid is channeled to regions whose produc-
tion structure is similar to that of LDC s, and hence, suffering most from
new competitors abroad. The same cannot be said for non-regional sub-
Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen.
2
A program opposed by mountainous, landlocked Bavaria, even though
two of the coastal states are governed by the CDU, sister party of the
Bavarian CSU.- 26 -
sidization; here overall competitiveness of the industry is crucial. Demands
for new regional aid grograms outside of regular channels in Germany
therefore have major implications for LDC exporters. While heretofore
German producers threatened by LDC competition could count on aid only
if they were not concentrated regidnally, if demands for new protection
are met they will receive aid even if they are concentrated regionally.
This, in turn, implies that the aid will be more concentrated on individual
branches than heretofore. And, the fact that the number of employees
has a positive influence on this type of aid means that the large old
established industries suffering from LDC competition can be expected
to get above average support from domestic sources in the future.
D, EEC Foreign Trade Protection
34. It should be borne in mind that these conclusions hold for domestic
assistance, which is granted besinde EEC tariff protection. While an
analysis of EEC tariff setting along the lines pursued for Germany surpass
the bounds of this paper, a number of useful things can be said about the
determinants of EEC tariff policy because some of the variables used to
explain the German case are unambiguously related to the same deter-
minants in other EEC countries.
- This would be true of human and physical capital intensity across
industries in the absence of factor reversals.
- This may be true of the cross industry structure of the number of firms,
because technological considerations play a key role in determining
industrial concentration.
- This may also be true of the cross industry structure of the change in
the number of employees, but of course not in the absolute number of
employees.- 27 -
35. On this rationals, a regression to explain the inter-industry structure
of EEC effective tariffs was run, an approach equivalent to the one Riedel
(1977) chose for the explanation of changes in tariff structure:
In TAR = 4. 21 + 0. 01 In DNOE - 0. 06 In NOF - 0. 74 In HUM
(4.71) (0.10) (-1.73) (-4.22)
+ 0.43 1nKAP R
2 = 0.53 F = 8.00
(3.97)
where t-statistics are in parentheses and notation is as in Table 4. The
equation as a whole significantly explains the EEC tariff structure, and
lends support to the hypothesis that a political market was operative during
the harmonization process upon founding of the EEC. At the community
level, it appears that the interests of unskilled labor, of physical capital,
and of concentrated industries prevail. Of particular interest to LDC ex-
porters is the size of influence of human capital intensity: labor intensive
industries are heavily discriminated against, a phenomenon not observable
in this form for German domestic protection, especially not for non-regional
aid. These results for the structure of EEC tariff protection are largely
consistent with Riedel' s (1977) results, who found that reductions in effec-
tive total protection were the lower, the greater employment in the industry,
the lower the human capital intensity, and the lower the industry' s previous
growth rate.
36. Summarizing the salient results of this section, the empirical evidence
lends support to the hypothesis that the political process in Germany can
be characterized as responding to demands for protection on the part of
interest groups on the basis of vote maximizing; that interest groups'
demand for protection is heavily influenced by excludibility considerations;
that the source of the disturbance (domestic vs. foreign) matters in granting
assistance, and that domestic protection and tariff protection are substitutes.
However, the regional component of subsidization, heavily weighted by the
joint federal/state program for improving the regional economic structure,
obeys its own laws. At least within this and related regional program the
expected log-rolling process has been stymied.- 28 -
IV. Conclusions
37. Overall, the opportunity cost of protection hypothesis can explain
the evolution over time of protection in Germany during the democratic
phases, as well as the interindustry structure of protection currently.
When the growth climate is poor, producers tend to ask for, and obtain,
increased assistance. At a point in time, when average opportunity costs
of protection are fixed, lobbying and vote maximizing behavior determine
protection. While peculiar institutional conditions for distributing aid
need to be taken into account, especially the joint federal/state regional
development program, in formulating sharp hypotheses on the influence
of industry employment and regional concentration, there is some indica-
tion that such institutions are being eroded, and that simple (popular) vote
maximizing will become even more important in the future.
38. The implications of this analysis are somewhat pessimistic for
future trends in German trade policy in general and for LDC exporters
to German markets in particular. Apparently, tariff reduction is only
possible in an environment favorable to economic growth. Yet the interest
groups which demand higher assistance by their very success limit the
growth rate. A solution to this dilemma is surely not easy. For the new-
comers to world markets in manufactures, the present results suggest
that assistance to industry in Germany shall be still more concentrated
on sectors especially prone to competition from LDC s like the old, large,
regionally concentrated industries.- 29 -
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